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The future of integrated broadband networks (IBN S)1 has yet to 
arrive. Although the extraordinary theoretical technical capacities of 
this new form of transmission seem well established, the ultimate use 
for IBN s is not. That must await the answer to many questions: Which 
entities will operate IBN s? Which businesses will choose the use IBN s? 
Which services will offer IBN s? What will be the long-term regulatory 
environment for IBNs? Perhaps most importantly, which IBN services 
will consumers want? Due to these unanswered questions, many as-
pects of the future of IBNs remain unclear. 
Given human nature, however, specific legal problems are certain 
to arise. The insatiable human appetite for mischief, information, por-
nography, and anti-competitive activity guarantees that the many legal 
conflicts that afflict computers, telephones, cable television, and broad-
casting will be visited upon IBN s. This article focuses on several of 
these legal problems. By examining the history of recent controversies 
involving the electronic media and breaches of security, protection of 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of BaItimore School of Law. B.A., 1976, Hampshire 
College; J.D., 1979, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1. An integrated broadband network on fiberoptic cable (lBN) is a new technology which 
is capable of carrying an abundance of information formerly delivered via broadcast, telephone 
wires, and print. IBNs transmit voice, image, video, and data over a single digital fiberoptic 
circuit. This technology can provide a full range of services, from carrying the public telephone 
net to cable television, as well as several new services such as picture telephony, high-speed 
videotex and video-conferencing. 
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privacy, regulation of sexual material and refusals to deal and 
similarities or differences between the "old" technologies and IBNs, 
this article attempts to outline some possible solutions to forestall, or 
limit, future legal conflicts2 in the use of IBN s. 
II. HACKING AND VIRUSES 
The 1980s revealed the fragility of computer security. In 1983, a 
group of teenagers used a simple home computer to break into the 
radiation treatment computer at the Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer 
Center, gaining not only access to the treatment records of patients, 
but also the ability to alter the radiation level each patient received. 3 
A "logic bomb" sabotaged the central computer at the Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power in 1985, rearranging data and making 
critical information temporarily inaccessible. 4 And in 1988, a computer 
virus, allegedly created by a twenty-three year old graduate student, 
quickly paralyzed 6,000 military and university computers across the 
country. 5 
The two-way capabilities of an IBN create similar possibilities for 
mischief. One promised benefit of an IBN is that individuals can trans-
mit as well as receive information. Once people hook into the network, 
however, preventing the next generation of hackers from either break-
ing into the information stream of others or sending destructive im-
pulses into the system will be difficult. 
Current law is unable to cope with the recent assaults on computer 
systems, and thus is unlikely to prevent and punish invasions of IBN s. 
For example, the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 
makes it a crime to "intentionally, without authorization, access any 
computer of a department or agency of the United States."6 Since the 
verb "access" is not defined, the question of whether a person who 
creates a computer virus which jumps from one program to another 
violates the Act remains unanswered. Further, "intent" is difficult to 
establish where a case involves a simple prank. 
2. There is one critical preliminary issue that must be resolved: the regulatory status of 
IBNs. Numerous legal questions depend on whether IBNs are classified as common carriers. 
These questions include who is permitted to own IBNs and whether there is governmental 
regulation of rates and business practices of IBNs. These issues have been well-analyzed in 
Botein, The Regulatory Status of Integrated Broadband Networks: A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 65 (1990). 
3. Yee, Juvenile Computer Crime, 7 COMM. ENT. 335 (1984). 
4. Stewart, Police Plug Into Computer Criminal, L.A. Times, June 2, 1985, at 2. 
5. Branscomb, Rogue Computer Programs and Computer Rogues, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER 
& TECHNICAL L.J. 1, 6-11 (1990). 
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (Supp. 1990). 
1990] LEGAL ISSUES: INTEGRATED BROADBAND NETWORKS 51 
Similarly, federal wiretap laws may fail to prevent invasions. The 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19687 was amended 
in 1988 to prohibit the interception of wire or oral electronic communi-
cations.8 The focus of the Act, however, is on protecting "communica-
tion," the passing of information between parties, rather than on pro-
tecting all information, including that which has been generated but 
not communicated to others. 9 The Act also contains no restrictions on 
those who might add to or alter information in a system. 
Since destruction of information transmitted by an IBN would have 
a devastating effect, not only on the users of the system, but on the 
future development of IBNs generally, criminal penalties for destroy-
ing IBN transmitted information should be enacted before IBN s be-
come totally operational. The law must protect both the IBN and the 
information that the IBN transmits. The law should make it a felony: 
A) to knowingly insert information or instructions into an 
IBN which does or is likely to alter, delay, disrupt or destroy 
any other information or programming transmitted either 
over the IBN or through a device connected to the network; 
B) to knowingly obtain information or programming without 
authorization through an IBN; 
C) to use an IBN to obtain money, property or services by 
false or fraudulent means; 
D) to copy information or proprietary programs without the 
permission of the owner; or 
E) to knowingly use or disclose codes, passwords, and similar 
means of access to information without the consent of the 
owner. 
Penalties for violating the law should be severe, including punish-
ment by fine and imprisonment. Additionally, any individual or entity 
that suffers a loss due to a violation of the law should have a civil 
damage claim against the violators. 
III. PRIVACY 
IBN s will be able to offer consumers and businesses a wide range 
of services. A single IBN system can provide all of the following: high 
definition television, non-broadcast video entertainment, picture tele-
phones, home shopping, home security, polling, data bases and vid-
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2540 (Supp. 1990). 
8. 18 U.S.C. § 251l(1)(a) (Supp. 1990). 
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1), (2) (1988). 
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eotext. However, this extensive capability also means that an enorm-
ous amount of personal information will flow through the same conduit. 
The ease and low cost of compiling this private data will pose a direct 
threat to consumer privacy and business proprietary information. 
Historically, when information is compiled, others seek access to 
it. For example, government agents can peruse library records to see 
which books an individual reads.lO Additionally, in Utah, when one 
supplier of telephone services was charged with violating laws on 
telephone pornography, the United States Attorney attempted to sub-
poena records to identify which individuals had voluntarily called the 
service. ll Similarly, the owner of an Ohio adult movie theater charged 
with exhibiting obscene movies sought a court order to obtain the 
names of the cable subscribers who viewed similar movies on the local 
cable television system. 12 Further, the direct mail market industry 
continually seeks improved, more precise information about the Amer-
ican public. The wealth of information potentially conveyed over an 
IBN would be economically attractive to those seeking to locate poten-
tial customers. Finally, creditors, insurers and employers may also 
have a similar economic use for the information carried by an IBN. 
If violations of either individual or business privacy occur when 
IBNs initially become available, however, the resulting lack of con-
sumer trust in IBN s could hinder or doom their development. Accord-
ingly, by the time IBN s finally become operational, privacy protection 
should already be in place. Existing legislation, especially the Federal 
Cable Act13 and Fair Credit Reporting Act,14 provide a useful 
framework for IBN protection. 
The Cable Act wisely draws a distinction between "personally iden-
tifiable information," which can identify particular persons or house-
holds, and "aggregate data" which only analyzes large groups but does 
not permit individual identification. 15 All limits in the Act on gathering 
and distributing information for cable television refer only to "person-
ally identifiable information. "16 The same rule should apply to IBN s. 
10. See Brown v. Johnston, 328 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa), eert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983). 
11. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d, 546, 557 n.4 (2d Cir. 1988). 
12. See D. NASH & J. SMITH, INTERACTIVE HOME MEDIA AND PRIVACY 52-57 (1981). 
The cable company ultimately agreed to provide only aggregate viewing data that did not 
disclose individual names. Id. at 53. 
13. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. 1990). 
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1990). 
15. 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(2) (Supp. 1990). 
16. 47 U.S.C. § 555(b) (Supp. 1990). 
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Similarly, two exceptions in the Cable Act are applicable to IBNs. 
First, a cable operator may collect personal information that is neces-
sary for providing a service to the subscribers. 17 Obviously, a cable 
operator offering pay-per-view must know what program the paying 
customer wants to receive. Such information is essential for the IBN 
operator as well. Second, the cable operator can sweep the system to 
search for unauthorized reception of cable service. IS Again, the IBN 
operator should also be able to insure that only those paying for a 
service are receiving it. 
A related issue concerns how the collection and dissemination of 
personal information should be authorized. The Cable Act requires 
"positive 'consent" by the subscriber's affirmative act rather than per-
mitting the cable operator to imply consent from a subscriber's failure 
to respond to a request for permission. 19 Requiring positive consent 
is crucial, since it provides the only means for insuring that the sub-
scribers knowingly and voluntarily consented. 
An additional limitation needed on the collection of information is 
the disposal of personally identifiable information after a specified 
period of time. The Cable Act requires cable operators to destroy 
information when no need remains for the purposes for which it was 
acquired. 20 Alternatively, the Fair Credit Reporting Act prescribes 
specific time limits after which "obsolete" information must be de-
stroyed.21 These time controls help limit the potential damage arising 
from any future breach of security. 
The limitations on the dissemination of information compiled 
through an IBN should be similar to the limits outlined above for the 
collection of information. Unless specific consent has been given, infor-
mation should only be disclosed under certain conditions. First, a 
private entity should only receive information that is necessary for 
the provision of a specifically requested service. Thus, the transfer of 
information by either a provider of an IBN service, an IBN operator, 
or a parent or related company would not be necessary for the provi-
17. 47 U.S.C. § 551(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1990). 
18. 47 U.S.C. § 551(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1990). 
19. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1984). (This legislative history to the 
Cable Act is generally termed "House Report.") The only exception to the requirement for 
"positive consent" is for the distribution of subscribers' names and addresses for mailing list 
purposes. The information that may be given out pursuant to this exception is quite limited; 
no private data, such as the choice of programming viewed or transactions made of the system, 
may be conveyed. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (c)(2)(c) (Supp. 1987). 
20. 47 U.S.C. § 551(e) (Supp. 1990). 
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1988). 
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sion of a requested service and should be prohibited. This rule has 
the additional benefit of limiting the competitive advantage a monopoly 
IBN operator might have if permitted to compete in the provision of 
non-monopoly services. 
Governmental entities might also seek information compiled 
through an IBN. The 1977 Report of the Privacy Protection Study 
Commission recommends that personal information, "should not be 
accessible to government unless government can show a compelling 
interest that outweighs the individual's interest to be free from gov-
ernment intrusion."22 Similarly, the Cable Act requires that a govern-
ment entity prove by clear and convincing evidence that the subject 
of the information sought is a reasonable suspect of criminal activity 
and that the information sought would be material evidence.23 Thus, 
in a situation similar to that of the Ohio adult movie theater owner, 
the Cable Act would prohibit the disclosure of the names of cable 
subscribers because the suspect of criminal activity was the adult 
movie owner, not the subscribers. 
The Cable Act also requires that the subject of the information 
receive notification of the request for information and have the oppor-
tunity to contest the government's request. 24 This additional require-
ment insures that the subject of the information will know when infor-
mation is requested and that the safeguards are followed. Further, 
to make the legal protections meaningful, consumers must be fully 
informed of their rights. Thus, IBN operators should be required to 
give periodic notice of consumer rights to the consumers using the 
network. 25 A mechanism that permits individuals to learn what infor-
mation an IBN maintains on them and allows individuals to correct 
erroneous information in their files is also needed. The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act requires credit agencies to review disputed information 
and either correct the information or permit consumers to send recip-
ients of the disputed information the consumer's opposing or explana-
tory statement. 
Heavy penalties should be imposed on VIolators of the privacy 
rules. IBN operators, service providers, and their employees should 
22. Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society 362 
(1977). 
23. 47 U.S.C. § 551(h) (Supp. 1990). 
24. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2), 551(h) (Supp. 1990); House Report, at 77-79. 
25. This is similar to the Cable Act's requirement that cable operators give annual notice 
of privacy rights to subscribers. 47 U.S.C. § 551(a) (Supp. 1990). 
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(i) (1990). The Cable Act requires that subscribers be given a "reason-
able opportunity to correct any error in information," 47 U.S.C. § 551(d) (Supp. 1990), but does 
not detail the procedures that are involved. 
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all be subject to civil and criminal penalties. The individual whose 
privacy has been violated should recover compensation for damages 
suffered, with at least a statutory minimum recovery plus attorney 
fees. Additionally, the government should criminally prosecute offen-
ders to enforce privacy protection. Ultimately, specific legal responsi-
bility for creating a system capable of safeguarding information must 
be assigned. 27 IBN operators and service providers should both be a 
part of this system. As technology advances, responsibility for protec-
tion should expand to include all reasonable physical and electronic 
safeguards of personally identifiable information. 
IV. PORNOGRAPHY 
Apparently, those wishing to disseminate pornographic material 
operate in all effective mediums. For every form of communication, 
some choose to convey what others would term pornography. Inevit-
ably, IBNs will transmit pornography. The question is, how will soci-
ety choose to react? 
Pornography is not a legal term, but merely common parlance for 
depictions of sexual activity that some consider offensive. The legal 
term "obscenity" describes material falling beyond the protection of 
the first amendment.28 Without the protective shield of the first amend-
ment, the use of obscene material can be severely limited. Con-
sequently, questions arise, because the test for "obscenity," is difficult 
to evaluate. For material to be classified legally obscene, the Supreme 
Court asks: 
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work 
depicts, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value. 29 
However, the Supreme Court treats children differently than adults 
in the determination of obscenity. Acceptable material for adults may 
still be obscene for children if the work appeals to the prurient interests 
of children, is patently offensive to children, and lacks serious value 
27. Such a requirement is noticeably absent from the Cable Act. 
28. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). 
29. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Legal obscenity is frequently referred to 
as "Miller obscene." [d. at 24. 
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for children.30 Thus, society can protect minors from material that is 
inappropriate for minors, even if the material is otherwise protected 
by the first amendment. The government may not, however, "reduce 
the adult population to reading only what is fit for children."31 This 
dichotomy creates a twisted path of cases, resulting in a variety of 
standards for permissible regulation that change with the medium. 32 
For broadcasting, the Supreme Court permits the Federal Com-
munication Commission (FCC) to ban, at least during the middle of 
the day, programming that is "indecent" but does not rise to the level 
of obscenity.33 The current definition of "indecency" is "language or 
material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offen-
sive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broad-
cast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs."34 Thus, "dirty 
words" and "dirty pictures" can be kept from the airwaves, even 
without a showing that they appeal to prurient interest and even if 
the program, as a whole, presents material of serious value. 35 
The Supreme Court permits the banning of indecent broadcasting 
because that broadcasting is "uniquely pervasive" and "uniquely acces-
sible to children. "36 The Court notes that, unlike book sellers and 
movies theater owners, broadcasters can not segregate the children 
in their audience from adults. 37 Since broadcast programs are easily 
obtained by unsupervised children, indecent material can be withheld 
from children only by stopping the source of the programming. 
The situation differs for cable television. As with other media, 
cable is prohibited from disseminating obscene material. 38 Unlike 
30. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
31. Bolger v. Young's Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 
352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957». 
32. See infm notes 33-57 and accompanying text. 
33. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
34. In Re Infinity Broadcasting, 3 FCC Reg. 930 (1988). The original definition of indecency 
also included the limitation that a determination of offensiveness must consider whether a 
broadcast occurred "at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be 
in the audience." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732 (quoting FCC regulations, 56 FCC 2d 94, 98 (1975». 
Under current federal law, indecent broadcasts are banned 24 hours a day. 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 
This total ban, however, may be suspect since it fails to consider whether the need to protect 
children outweighs the interests of adults from obtaining the material. See Action for Children's 
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
35. Pacifica, 438 U.S., at 750-51. 
36. Id. at 748, 749. 
37. Id. at 749. 
38. It is a federal criminal offense to transmit obscene cable programming, punishable by 
a fine or imprisonment for up to two years or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1468 (1988). 
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broadcasting, however, courts have consistently refused to prevent 
localities from banning indecent programming from cable television. 39 
Cable differs from broadcasting because its technology permits each 
individual homeowner to decide whether specific channels should enter 
the home. Both addressable converters and so-called "lock-boxes" per-
mit individuals to block out programming they find offensive. 40 Thus, 
children can be protected without silencing the source. 
Telephones have created many legal battles. In 1983, federal law 
criminalized "dial-a-porn. "41 After repeated litigation and three sets of 
FCC regulations, the law, at least in some form, passed judicial 
scrutiny.42 The first FCC regulation permitted dial-a-porn only during 
9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. eastern standard time or to those paying by 
credit card.43 This regulation, however, made dial-a-porn available from 
6:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. in California, but presumably children on the 
West Coast have different bed times. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit found this regulation unconstitutional because it un-
necessarily restricted the ability of adults to use dial-a-porn services.44 
Two years later, the same court struck down the second set of FCC 
regulations that replaced the time-channeling restriction with a re-
quirement that providers of dial-a-porn send messages only to adults 
who had obtained a special identification code. 45 The court ruled again 
39. Wilkinson v. Jones, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987), afrg memo 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), 
afrg Community Television, Inc. V. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985); Cruz V. Ferre, 
755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Community Television, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. 
Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. V. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982). Although 
the Supreme Court affirmed a decision striking down a cable indecency law, the Court did not 
issue an opinion, thus it is not certain whether all cable indecency laws are invalid. See Meyerson, 
The Right to Speak, The Right to Hear, and the Right Not to Hear: The Technological Resolution 
to the Cable/Pornography Debate, 21 MICH. J. LAW REF. 137, 156-57 (1987). 
40. The Cable Act requires cable operators to make such devices available to all subscribers 
who request them. 47 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(a) (Supp. 1987). 
41. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (Supp. 1987). That is the use of a telephone for making, "any obscene 
or indecent communication for commercial purposes to any person under eighteen years of age 
.... " Id. 
42. FCC regulations promulgated in the Third Report and Order, Enforcement of Prohib-
itions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene Materials, 2 FCC 
Reg. 2714 (1987) were finally upheld in Carlin Communications, Inc. V. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d 
Cir. 1988) ("Carlin III"), after previous rules were struck down in Carlin Communications, Inc. 
V. FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Carlin I") and Carlin Communications, Inc. V. FCC, 787 
F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Carlin II"). 
43. See Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 113 (quoting Report and Order, 49 Fed. Reg. 24996, 25003 
(1989). 
44. Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 123. 
45. Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 856. 
58 UNNERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 3 
that less restrictive means such as blocking devices, existed for pro-
tecting children. 
Ultimately, the court of appeals upheld the FCC's third set of 
regulations that provided dial-a-porn could be transmitted if the service 
required credit card payment prior to transmission, an identification 
code obtainable by written application, or scrambled messages making 
the service only obtainable through a de scrambling device. 46 The court 
ruled that these requirements reached a proper balance by restricting 
the ability of children to receive the service, while imposing non-bur-
densome restrictions on service providers and willing adult custom-
ers.47 The court, however, found the provision governing indecent 
programming unconstitutional. 48 Finding that technology exists to pro-
tect individual homeowners and that callers must affirmatively seek 
the phone messages, current law prohibits the regulation of indecent 
phone messages. 49 Thus, the court ruled that only obscene messages 
are prohibited. 50 
Once a court determines that the service is obscene, the FCC does 
not need to search for "the least restrictive alternative." The govern-
ment's interest in protecting adults' right to receive information that 
is obscene for children, was premised on adults' constitutional right 
to receive communication protected by the first amendment. Since 
obscenity is not protected by the first amendment, constitutionally 
the right of adults to receive obscene telephone messages is not of 
particular concern to the FCC. Such solicitude is only warranted for 
protected speech, which includes indecent speech. The court of appeals, 
however, seemed to confuse the obscenity/indecency dichotomy with 
the concept that services can be obscene for minors, but not for 
adults.51 For the latter situation, consideration for the rights of adults 
to receive the indecent programming is indeed appropriate, since inde-
cent programming is protected communication for adults. 
In response to the trio of cases addressing minors' access to dial-a-
porn, Congress amended the law in April 1988 to prohibit obscene 
46. Third Report and Order, 2 FCC Reg. 2714, 2719-20 (1987). 
47. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 556. The Court added that the FCC would have to reconsider 
its ruling were a simpler protective device to become available. Specifically, the Court referred 
to a system whereby the service provider would precede its message with a three-tone sound. 
An inexpensive listening device, installed at home telephones, would immediately disconnect 
the telephone line from all desiring to block the services. The Court found that if this device 
were technically feasible, it might be the least restrictive means for regulating dial-a-porn. Id. 
48. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 560. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Gin.~berg, 390 U.S. at 639-40. 
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and indecent commercial telephone communication to any recipient, 
regardless of age. 52 The Supreme Court upheld the ban on commercial 
telephone obscenity, but found the prohibition on indecent commercial 
telephone communication unconstitutional. 63 The Court held that the 
earlier FCC rules showed a "feasible and effective" method existed 
for protecting children from indecency. 54 The Court also noted that 
the danger for a "surprised" listener was not the same with telephone 
as with broadcasting, because the recipients of telephone messages 
are callers, who voluntarily seek the messages. 55 The Court also ac-
cepted the fact that some children would be able to circumvent any 
technological safeguard by stating that "a few of the most enterprising 
and disobedient young people will manage to secure access to such 
messages."55 Because this number was relatively small, the Court con-
cluded that the total ban on indecency was "not a narrowly tailored 
effort to serve the compelling interest of preventing minors from being 
exposed to indecent telephone messages."57 How does this affect IBNs? 
Certainly under current law, obscene programming and services can 
be banned, from the network. The unsettled areas concern whether 
indecent, but not obscene, programming and services can be banned 
and how to protect children from material that is obscene for them, 
but not obscene for adults. 
The technology of IBN s will probably permit individual homeown-
ers to decide what programming and services enter their homes. 
Scrambling and locking devices will enable only those who wish to 
receive certain programming to do so. As with telephones and cable 
television, IBN s should rely on individual, rather than governmental, 
censorship to control indecent communication. 
Scrambling and locking devices will also permit parents to protect 
their children from receiving programming that is obscene for minors. 
As with telephones, any regulation of such material should involve 
the least restrictive alternative for adults' right to receive constitution-
ally protected communication. Thus, a requirement that any IBN 
52. 47 u.s.c. § 223(b), amended by Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 424 (1988). The law 
also removed the FCC's rules, on the theory that special protections were not needed since a 
total ban was in effect. Later in 1988, this law was further amended to permit enforcement of 
the dial-a-porn ban, but only through criminal prosecutions. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4502 
(1988). 
53. Sable Communication of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989). 
54. [d. at 2837. 
55. [d. 
56. [d. at 2838. 
57. [d. at 2839. 
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which services providers and programmers of "obscene for children" 
communications assist parents with restricting the communication may 
be permissible. Possible alternatives include prior notification of such 
programming or services and grouping such programs together, mak-
ing blocking devices effective. Once parents are empowered to protect 
their children, other adults who desire the "obscene for children" com-
munication should receive it. 
One question of censorship remains. Should the operator of the 
IBN be permitted to censor? The telephone cases show a discomforting 
trend. Michigan Bell, for example, decided to exclude a host of services 
that the company found, "inflammatory, and likely to offend ethnic, 
gender, racial or religious groups; lewd, lascivious, indecent or 
obscene; ... or likely to have a detrimental effect on Michigan Bell's 
image or reputation."58 The danger of private censorship, unchecked 
by either competitive pressure or constitutional requirements, is unde-
sirable. 
One court, in upholding telephone company censorship, found that 
because the service went to many listeners simultaneously, "the phone 
company resembles less a common carrier than it does a small radio 
station. "59 Accordingly, the court allowed the telephone company to 
edit the service. 60 The court erred in its reasoning, however, since 
the service provider, not the telephone company, is broadcasting; the 
service provider should be the one compared to a radio station, not 
the telephone company. The telephone company merely acts as the 
conduit through which the messages are transmitted. The role of con-
duit and content should not be confused. Laws permitting protection 
not only of minors but the "image and reputation" of a company, 
permit the unilateral and unlimited power to censor. 
v. REFUSAL TO DEAL 
The history of electronic communications is replete with conflicts 
of vertically integrated monopolies refusing to deal with potential com-
petitors. In these conflicts, much depends on who receives the gov-
ernmental right to control access to essential facilities. In the 1980s, 
providers of long distance telephone service litigated to gain the right 
58. Quoted in Pepper, Through the Looking Glass: Integrated Broadband Networks, Reg-
ulatory Policies, and Institutional Change 66 (OPP Working Paper Series No. 24; Office of 
Plans and Policy, FCC, November 1988) (emphasis added). 
59. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1294 
(9th Cir. 1987). 
60. Id. 827 F.2d at 1297. 
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to connect to local telephone exchanges. 61 Cable television operators 
were also struggling to gain access to telephone poles for their cable 
network. In response, some telephone companies, often desiring to 
construct the cable facilities themselves, denied access altogether or 
charged exorbitant monopoly prices to the cable television operators. 62 
Similarly, cable operators act anti-competitively by using their exc-
lusive franchising to help their own programming services. For exam-
ple, cable companies who own pay movie channels may remove or bar 
competing programmers from their systems. 63 Additionally, cable-
owned popular programming services have been denied to cable's com-
petitors, such as multichannel, multipoint distribution systems.64 Over-
all, those in control of essential facilities tend to benefit their own 
vertically-integrated corporate siblings. 
Consequently, policy makers and regulators need to design a reg-
ulatory system which prohibits anti-competitive behavior regardless 
of the eventual industry structure. The decision as to which regulatory 
structure is chosen for IBNs should reflect this consideration. Further, 
once a structure is chosen, pro competitive safeguards must be im-
plemented. 
Initially, the physical architecture of the IBN must be one that 
encourages mUltiple users. One possible model is the Open Network 
Architecture (ONA) which the FCC requires the Bell Operating Com-
61. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cm. 
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). 
62. See, e.g., TV Signal Co. v. American Tel. & Tel., 617 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1980). The 
Federal Pole Attachment Act permits the regulation of the rate a utility charges a cable operator 
for use of the pole. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (Supp. 1987). 
63. See, e.g., New York Citizens Comm. on Cable TV v. Manhattan Cable TV, Inc., 651 
F. Supp. 802 (S.D. N.Y. 1986). See also Nadel, COMCAR: A Marketplace Cable Television 
Franchise Structure, 20 HARV. J. LEGIS. 541, 548 n.40 (1983) (describing how one cable operator 
refused to carry a'channel offering 24-hour news so that it could offer its own news channel 
instead). 
64. See National Telecommunications and Information Admin., Video Program Distribution 
and Cable Television: Current Policy Issues and Recommendations 89-107 (1988). The National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration found no serious threat to competition by 
vertically-integrated companies' refusal to deal. It is possible, however, to be more skeptical 
and concerned about anti-competitive actions. The report describes instances such as the sudden 
turn-around when the Cable News Network adopted a policy against selling multichannel, mul-
tipoint distribution systems shortly after several cable operators acquired a financial interest 
in its parent company. The report also ignores the issue of whether new competitors for existing 
cable programs will ever start, knowing that to survive they must gain access to systems that 
own the very services with which they want to compete. 
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panies to adopt prior to offering enhanced services. 65 The Justice De-
partment guidelines facilitate understanding of the components of an 
ONA. The Justice Department defined ONA as a regime that "encour-
ages dominant carriers to implement technological change that, by 
decreasing competitive risks, will reduce the need for regulation."66 
At the heart of this architecture, transmission of information is trans-
parent.67 Such transmission is open to all service providers making 
discrimination by the carrier difficult or impossible, and is designed 
to make detection of carrier cross-subsidization simple. 68 The underly-
ing technology makes the system accessible and refusals to deal obvi-
OUS. 69 Any authorization for IBN s should include a similar architectural 
requirement. 
Moreover, specific policies requiring open access should be in place 
before the IBN system is built. Whether the IBN operator is permitted 
to offer programming and information services, or is able to enter 
into exclusive lease arrangements with service providers, an incentive 
to discriminate against other providers would be present. There should 
be an explicit requirement that the IBN offer service to all customers 
on a non-discriminatory basis. 70 No IBN operator should be permitted 
to harm a direct or indirect competitor either by denying service or 
offering inferior service. Creating a system in which, unlike the cable 
industry, programs and services only survive when marketplace de-
mand for them exist, and not simply because they are protected from 
competition by the monopoly conduit, is socially desirable and econom-
ically efficient. Additionally,. those entering the business of operating 
an IBN system should know at the outset that profits will not come 
from anti-competitive practices. 
VI. WHOSE SPEECH Is IT? 
A final issue for consideration is whether the speech, data and 
programming that an IBN carries must be attributed to the IBN 
operator, even when an unaffiliated entity furnishes the information 
to the IBN. Should the IBN operator be legally responsible for illegal, 
libelous and otherwise undesirable material that it does not produce, 
but carries over its wires? 
65. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, CC Docket 
No. 85-229, Report and Order, 104 FCC 2d 958 (1986) ("Computer III"). AT&T was largely 
excused from these requirements in 2 FCC Reg. 3035 (1987) ("Phase I Recon Order"). 
66. Computer Ill, 104 FCC 2d at 1063. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id., 104 FCC 2d at 1063. 
70. See supra note 58, at 57. 
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Some telephone companies have been warned that they are respon-
sible for the services they carry. A local prosecutor threatened Moun-
tain Bell with prosecution for carrying a dial-a porn service in violation 
of state law barring the distribution of explicit sexual material to 
minors.71 Consequently, Mountain Bell immediately discontinued the 
service. 72 
In contrast, cable operators, who have been barred from interfering 
with the public access programs, are immunized against liability for 
such programming. 73 A court found an early FCC rule, making cable 
operators liable for carrying obscene access programs, unconstitutional 
because the FCC rule forced the operator to serve as, "both judge 
and jury, and subjected the cable user's first amendment rights to 
decision by an unqualified private citizen. "74 
To avoid the recurrence of unqualified censorship, IBN operators 
need similar protection. A wide range of concerns about speech can 
be raised; such as libel, obscenity, invasion of privacy, disclosure of 
trade secrets, and incitement. 
The IBN operator is not capable of pre screening all communication 
to determine the propriety of content. Moreover, the operator is not 
qualified to make the exceedingly difficult legal judgments concerning 
when protected speech crosses the line to illegality. Thus, each indi-
vidual programmer and service provider should be held strictly liable 
for the communication they produce. In contrast, IBN operators should 
only be accountable for the programming they control. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court stated that, "Each method of communicating 
ideas is a law unto itself, and that law must reflect the differing 
natures, values, abuses, and dangers of each method. "75 This principle 
should direct policy makers, as well as constitutional adjudication. The 
technology and economics of IBNs require a legal framework that is 
sensitive to their nature. Regulators need not reinvent the wheel or 
wait for crises to arise. Our previous experience with other forms of 
71. Carlin Communications v. Mountain State Tel. & Tel., 827 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
72. Murphy, Phone Firms Can Ban "Dial-a-Porn" Lines, Court Says, L.A. Times, Sept. 
15, 1987 at 3. 
73. 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e), 558 (Supp. 1987). 
74. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1057 (8th Cir. 1987), affd on other 
grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
75. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (quoting Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring». 
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electronic communication not only illustrates the dangers that could 
engulf lBNs, but the possible solutions as well. 
Preliminary pro-competitive, pro-diversity, pro-privacy and pro-se-
curity measures can be implemented before the first electronic wave 
floats across the broadband cable. These measures will enhance busi-
ness planning by those involved in the industry, encourage trust in 
the system by others, and avoid unnecessary and wasteful repetitions 
of previously fought legal battles. History can be our guide for creating 
a legal framework that will permit lBNs to reach their full potential. 
